Melampaui Kontrak Hipotetis: Tabir Ketidaktahuan sebagai Perangkat Epistemik Radikal dalam Keadilan Rawlsian
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.31385/ledalogos.v2i1.525Keywords:
Veil of Ignorance, Epistemic Device;, Moral EqualityAbstract
This article advances a conceptual reinterpretation of the veil of ignorance within the theory of justice developed by John Rawls by positioning it not merely as a procedural device embedded in a hypothetical contract, but as a radical epistemic and moral instrument. Drawing on a critical reading of A Theory of Justice, the study argues that the veil of ignorance functions as a mechanism for purifying normative rationality from the distortions generated by social contingency, particular identity, and structural position. Rather than serving simply as a heuristic for selecting principles, the veil establishes conditions of epistemic restraint that suspend knowledge of morally arbitrary advantages. Through conceptual analysis and argumentative reconstruction, this article demonstrates that the epistemic dimension of the veil precedes and undergirds the selection of the two principles of justice, thereby constituting the deeper moral architecture of justice as fairness. By bracketing socially contingent facts, the device institutionalizes moral equality as the starting point of political deliberation and secures impartial justification in contexts of reasonable pluralism. Justice as fairness, therefore, cannot be reduced to contractual procedure; it emerges as an epistemological project aimed at constructing legitimacy through disciplined perspective-taking. The article concludes that the enduring normative force of Rawls’s framework lies in its radical reorientation of standpoint: by suspending particularistic perspectives, it renders public principles justifiable to free and equal persons. This reinterpretation enriches contemporary political philosophy by reaffirming the veil of ignorance as a foundational structure for normative reflection in modern theories of justice.
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